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ABSTRACT 
 
Korean listed firms have been required to disclose their financial statements based on the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 2011. Using pre- and post-IFRS 
reporting periods, we investigate the relation between IFRS non-audit consulting services 
provided by incumbent auditor and the cost of debt of its client for firms in the Korean Stock 
Market. We find evidence that IFRS non-audit consulting services are related to the decrease in 
cost of debt only during the post-IFRS period. In particular, receiving non-audit consulting 
services is positively associated with a client’s bond credit rating and negatively associated with 
interest rate. The result generally holds when we use alternative proxies of IFRS non-audit 
consulting services. Finally, our results are robust to potential endogeneity issues in selecting 
non-audit services. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
nderstanding the benefits and costs of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has 
become one of the major concerns to standard-setters and accounting professionals. However, empirical 
evidences of the effects of IFRS adoption on accounting quality are mixed. For instance, Barth et al. 
(2008) find that IFRS-adopting firms exhibit decreased income smoothing and increased timeliness of loss 
recognition. In contrast, Ahmed et al. (2013) find that accounting quality decreased after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Although the former study uses voluntary adopters and the latter uses mandatory adopters, there exist different 
views of the effect of IFRS on accounting quality.  
 
In our study, we investigate the effect of IFRS from a different point of view. In particular, we test whether 
auditor-provided IFRS consulting non-audit service (hereafter, ICS) is related to the decrease in cost of debt of the 
client firm. Given that creditors practically use numbers based on financial statements when they evaluate 
repayment capability of borrowers (Beatty et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005), the cost of debt is a useful measure to 
examine the impact of new accounting standards on investors’ perceptions of the credibility of financial statements.  
 
We use firms listed on the Korean stock market that are required to report their annual financial statements 
under IFRS since 2011. Securities regulators of Korea allow firms to receive ICS from their incumbent auditors to 
prepare appropriate financial reporting systems based on IFRS. If ICS increases the credibility of financial 
statements and reduce the information asymmetry between firms and creditors as regulators intended, we expect that 
ICS from the auditor lowers client firm’s cost of debt.   
 
Our results suggest that ICS firms exhibit decrease in cost of debt only in the post-IFRS period. 
Specifically, receiving ICS is positively associated with a client’s bond credit rating and negatively associated with 
interest rate. The results are generally consistent in the three different proxies of ICS and are robust to the existing 
endogeneity problem of selecting non-audit services from the incumbent auditor.  
U 
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Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to the existing debate on the effect of IFRS 
adoption, we provide evidence that firms preparing mandatory IFRS adoption by receiving ICS from their auditors 
face favorable economic consequences. Second, our finding that the cost of debt decreases in firms with ICS 
suggests that certain non-audit services with strong guidelines by the regulator are beneficial to client firms.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a background of IFRS adoption in Korea and 
introduces an ICS provision by auditors. Section III presents previous studies on the relation between non-audit 
services and cost of debt and introduces our hypothesis. Section IV presents data and methodology. Section V shows 
empirical results, and section VI concludes.  
 
2. IFRS ADOPTION IN KOREA AND IFRS RELATED NON-AUDIT CONSULTING SERVICES 
 
Korean capital markets have undergone fundamental changes arising from the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
in recent years. Korean listed firms expect some benefits as a consequence of the adoption of IFRS. For instance, 
adopting IFRS is motivated to improve both domestic and foreign investors’ perception of the transparency of 
financial statements disclosed by domestic firms.1 Since the Korean economy is heavily dependent on exports and 
financial markets affected by foreign capital, international accounting standards are indeed required by Korean 
companies. Consequently, the Korean government announced a 'roadmap' for the adoption of IFRS in 2007. Under 
the roadmap, all Korean listed firms were required to prepare their annual financial statements under IFRS 
beginning in 2011.  
 
To prepare for the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2011, most of the listed firms in Korea have purchased 
IFRS advisory services (ICSs) from their incumbent auditors as a non-audit service since 2007. Independent auditors 
in Korea are prohibited from providing consulting services related to establishing a financial information system to 
their audit clients following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). They are, however, allowed exceptionally to 
provide ICS to audit clients as long as they apply the Practical Guidelines (2008-1) of the Korea Financial 
Supervisory Service (K-FSS) with appropriate safeguards, which may reduce their self-review threat.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 The Effect of Non-Audit Services on Cost Of Debt 
 
There are conflicting predictions on the effect of non-audit services on the cost of debt. On the one hand, 
prior literature expects that non-audit services decrease accounting quality, thereby increasing cost of debt. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that fees paid to auditors build up an economic bond between the clients and their 
incumbent auditors reducing perceived auditor independence. Consistent with this prediction, Frankel et al. (2002) 
find evidence that economic bonding impairs auditor independence. More directly, Brandon et al. (2004) find that 
the relative proportion of non-audit fees to total fees is negatively associated with the firm’s bond rating. 
 
On the other hand, there is evidence which implies that the auditor has no relations with client’s cost of 
debt. For instance, Chung and Kallapur (2003) do not find a significant association between abnormal accruals and 
client importance measured as the ratio of total fees to total revenues or non-audit fees to total revenues. More 
closely related to the cost of debt, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) find that total fees paid to external auditors are not 
significantly associated with credit rating.2 In sum, these competing views suggest that the link between non-audit 
service provided by the auditor and cost of debt is not well established.  
 
  
                                                
1 This lack of reliability led to the Korean capital market suffering from the so-called ‘Korea Discount’ phenomenon, as global investors assess 
the Korean accounting system as lacking transparency. 
2 Although Ashbaugh et al. (2006) find no significant relations between total audit fees and credit ratings, they find other strong governances are 
positively associated with credit ratings. They find significant result when using blockholders, CEO power, takeover defense, accounting quality, 
and board characteristics for the governance proxies.  
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3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
We predict that ICS decreases clients’ cost of debt. There are two reasons to support this negative 
association. First, ICS increase the credibility of financial statements (Lee et al. 2013, 2014). For instance, Lee et al. 
(2013) find that firm’s financial disclosure quality is higher when their auditor jointly provides audit and ICS. 
Similarly, Lee et al. (2014) find that the analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersions who follow the 
firms receiving ICS have decreased and the number of analysts following them has increased more than non-ICS 
firms. These results show that receiving ICS increases the credibility of financial statements, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry between firms and outside information users.  
 
Second, due to the drastic changes in accounting regime from IFRS adoption in the Korean stock market, 
managers lack clear guidance regarding the new accounting standard. Therefore, preparing disclosure activities in 
advance by purchasing consulting services can improve investor perception of a firm’s disclosure policy. Given that 
non-audit service fees paid to auditor reduce net income, managers are reluctant to purchase it from their incumbent 
auditor. The rating agencies may award relatively higher credit ratings to ICS purchased firms. Also the creditors 
may reward ICS purchasing firms by lowering interest rates. Consistent with this prediction, Attig et al. (2013) find 
that credit rating agencies tend to award relatively high ratings to firms with good social performance. They suggest 
that corporate social responsibility activities are costs for firms, but they also convey information to rating agencies 
when evaluating firms’ value.  
 
To summarize, if ICS increases the credibility of financial statements and when investors believe that the 
expected future cash flow predicted by these financial reports is reliable then the cost of debt is likely to be reduced 
in the post-IFRS period. Therefore, we test the following directional hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis: Receiving IFRS non-audit consulting service from the auditor is positively (negatively) associated with 
the client firm’s credit ratings (interest rates) in the post-IFRS period. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Sample and Data 
 
Our sample consists of Korean listed firms during the sampling period starting in 2008 and ending in 2012. 
Korean listed firms mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2011 so the years from 2008 to 2010 (2011 to 2012) are 
documented as pre-IFRS (post-IFRS) period.  
 
The financial data used in our tests are extracted from the Total Solution (TS) 2000 database, which is 
provided by the Korea Listed Company Association. Non-audit services and other auditor characteristics were 
manually collected from K-FSS internet based disclosure system.3 We only include firms with fiscal years ending in 
December,4 and firms not operate in the financial industry. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 
99 percent.  
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution. Panel A of Table 1 shows yearly distribution of the sample. The 
total sample, which consists of 1,139 firm-years, includes 124 ICS-firms. Among ICS-firms, about 83% of the firms 
(103 firms out of 124 total firms) received ICS in the pre-IFRS period. This means that most of ICS-firms prepared 
new accounting standards before mandatory adoption of IFRS. Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry. 
We use the two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) code. 55 percent (56 percent) of total (ICS) 
firm-years are in the manufacturing industry (KSIC 10-33).    
 
  
                                                
3 K-FSS provides mandatory disclosed information of firms (http://dart.fss.or.kr/) similar to the Edgar filings in US.  
4 The fiscal year end of the most of Korean listed manufacturing firms is in December, whereas financial firms’ fiscal year ends in March.  
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4.2 Research Design 
 
4.2.1 Measuring IFRS Non-Audit Consulting Service 
 
We measure ICS, which is our main independent variable with three different proxies (Lee et al. 2014). The 
first proxy is CONSULTING that equals one if a client received consulting services from its incumbent auditor and 
zero otherwise. The second measure is FREQUENCY which indicates the cumulative number of consulting services 
that a client firm has received. Lastly, a third measure is FEE, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
cumulative fees paid to auditors providing ICS. 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution 
Panel A. Distribution by year 
Year Total sample ICS sample 
2008 203 21 
2009 204 39 
2010 227 43 
2011 241 14 
2012 264 7 
Total 1,139 124 
 
Panel B. Distribution by industry 
KSIC Code Industry Name Total sample ICS sample 
1~3 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4 0 
10~33 Manufacturing 628 69 
35~36 Electricity, gas, steam and water supply 28 2 
37~39 Sewage, waste management, materials recovery and remediation activities 5 0 
41~42 Construction 142 14 
45~47 Wholesale and retail trade 98 11 
49~52 Transportation 53 2 
55~56 Accommodation and food service activities 1 0 
58~63 Information and communications 73 6 
70~73 Professional, scientific and technical activities 105 20 
85 Education 2 0 
Total  1,139 124 
 
4.2.2 Measuring Cost of Debt 
 
We measure firms’ cost of debt by using two different proxies. First, following related studies, we use 
credit ratings (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Attig et al., 2013 among others). Firms 
that issue corporate bonds are obliged to receive credit ratings from the licensed rating agencies. In Korea, there are 
three major credit rating agencies which provide bond issuers’ ratings.5 We extract credit ratings data from the FN 
Data Guide database. To evaluate firms more conservatively, we use the lowest ratings among the three rating 
agencies.6 We assign a value of 19 if the firm has the highest ratings of AAA and 1 for the lowest rating of C, 
following prior studies.7  
 
Our second measure of cost of debt is interest rate. Following Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Francis et al. 
(2005) we calculated interest rate as interest expense divided by average of short- and long-term debt during the 
year. We expect increase in credit ratings and decrease in interest rates are associated with a decrease in the cost of 
debt.  
  
                                                
5 Those are Korea Investors Service (KIS), National Information & Credit Evaluation Inc. (NICE), and Korea Ratings (KR).  
6 The result is qualitatively similar when we use each credit ratings provided by different three rating agencies.  
7 Specifically, a value of 19 is assigned if the firm’s rating is AAA, 18 if AA+, 17 if AA, 16 if AA-, 15 if A+, 14 if A, 13 if A-, 12 if BBB+, 11 if 
BBB, 10 if BBB-, 9 if BB+, 8 if BB, 7 if BB-, 6 if B+, 5 if B, 4 if B-, 3 if CCC, 2 if CC, and 1 if C.  
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4.2.3 Difference-in-Differences Approach 
 
We employ the pre-IFRS period and the firms that do not purchase ICS as a benchmark sample. In our 
difference-in-differences design, we expect significant and negative association between receiving ICS and cost of 
debt in the post-IFRS period compared to the benchmark sample. The difference-in-differences approach is widely 
used in the literature when the effect of the change in the economic environment and contemporaneous change in 
time effect over years of the sample period co-exist (Daske et al., 2008; Ahmed et al. 2013). We estimate the 
following regression model: 
 
CODi,t = β0 + β1* ICSi,t + β2* IFRSt+ β3* ICSi,t *IFRSt + β4*SIZEi,t + β5*LEVi,t + β6*ROAi,t  
+ β7*CFOi,t + β8*EXPORTi,t + β9*GRWi,t + β10*LOSSi,t + β11*BETAi,t + β12*BIGi,t  
+ β13*OPNi,t + β14*LARGEi,t + β15*FOREIGNi,t  +Industry FE + ε i,t  (1) 
 
The dependent variable COD is a firm’s cost of debt defined as credit ratings or interest rates. ICS is 
measured by following three different proxies: (1) CONSULTING, (2) FREQUENCY, and (3) FEE. IFRS equals one 
if it is post-IFRS period, and zero otherwise. Since Korea adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2011, the IFRS variable 
equals zero from 2008 to 2010, and equals one in 2011 and 2012 in our sample. If firms that have received ICS from 
auditors are associated with cost of debt in the post IFSR period, then we expect significant β3. In particular, when 
the dependent variable is credit ratings (interest rate) then significant and positive (negative) β3 supports our 
hypothesis.  
 
Following prior literature, we include variables that are known to have an effect on the cost of debt. First, 
firm size (SIZE) is included because large firms are expected to have lower credit risk. Financial statement based 
default risk and performance variables are also controlled (LEV, ROA, and CFO following Ashbaugh et al. 2006 and 
Dhaliwal et al. 2008). Sales export to total sales (EXPORT) is included to control firm complexity, and sales growth 
(GRW) controls growth opportunities. A firm reporting a net loss (LOSS) is controlled because it is directly related 
to default risk. Stock return beta (BETA) is included to capture systematic risk of the firm. We also include the 
auditor characteristic such as auditor size (BIG) and audit opinion (OPN). Ownership of largest shareholder and its 
related parties (LARGE) as well as foreign ownership (FOREIGN) are included to control governance effects. 
Finally, we include industry fixed dummies to control the individual industry effect on the relation between the 
independent and dependent variables.8 Statistical significance reported in tables is based on the firm-level clustering.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics regarding the sample are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The mean value of 
CONSULTING is 0.11 showing that about 11% of our sample firms purchased ICS from their incumbent auditors at 
least once. The mean value of FREQUENCY is 0.45 and it is higher than mean value of CONSULTING because it 
reveals a cumulative frequency of ICS. Mean value of FEE is 3.88. RATING indicates credit ratings provided by 
rating agencies, and its mean value is 12.32 (between BBB+ and BBB). The mean and median values of interest rate 
(IR) are both 3%. Panel B of Table 2 presents mean and median difference between ICS and non-ICS firms. 
Confirming our hypothesis, both mean and median RATING of ICS firms are higher than that of non-ICS firms (t-
value 2.80 and z-value 2.76). Also, IR is significantly lower for ICS firms than non-ICS firm (t-value -1.83 and z-
value -1.96). The results of this univariate test generally support our hypothesis. Considering other variables, it is 
interpreted that ICS firms are larger, have higher performance and sales from foreign countries, report less losses, 
and foreign investors own more than in non-ICS firms.  
 
The untabualted pearson correlation results show that the correlation among ICS variables are positively 
significant (0.48 between CONSULTING and FREQUENCY, 0.50 between CONSULTING and FEE, and 0.89 
between FREQUENCY and FEE). As expected, ICS variables are positively (negatively) associated with RATING 
                                                
8 Due to IFRS dummy variable, we do not include year fixed effect in our regression model to avoid multicollinearity problem.  
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(IR). Other control variables show consistent correlation with ICS variables presented in the univariate test from 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Full sample 
Variables Mean STD P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
ICS variables        
CONSULTING 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FREQUENCY 0.45 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 
FEE 3.88 5.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.16 13.62 
Cost of debt variables        
RATING 12.32 4.16 3.00 10.00 13.00 16.00 19.00 
IR 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10 
Control variables        
SIZE 26.81 2.00 22.31 25.28 26.72 28.44 30.95 
LEV 0.54 0.18 0.10 0.42 0.56 0.66 0.96 
ROA 0.01 0.12 -0.53 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.24 
CFO 0.04 0.10 -0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.32 
EXPORT 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 
GRW 0.12 0.40 -0.87 -0.03 0.08 0.20 2.26 
LOSS 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BETA 0.86 0.40 0.04 0.56 0.86 1.14 1.77 
BIG 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
OPN 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LARGE 0.39 0.17 0.06 0.27 0.38 0.50 0.84 
FOREIGN 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.60 
 
Panel B. Mean and median differences 
 Mean differences Median differences 
Variables ICS Non- ICS t-value ICS Non- ICS z-value 
RATING 13.23 12.21 2.80*** 14.00 13.00 2.76*** 
IR 0.03 0.03 -1.83* 0.03 0.03 -1.96** 
SIZE 27.45 26.74 3.99*** 27.52 26.64 3.88*** 
LEV 0.52 0.54 -1.48 0.55 0.56 -1.27 
ROA 0.04 0.00 4.22*** 0.03 0.02 2.90*** 
CFO 0.04 0.04 0.74 0.04 0.04 0.55 
EXPORT 0.06 0.01 2.76*** 0.00 0.00 4.90*** 
GRW 0.15 0.12 0.80 0.11 0.08 1.89* 
LOSS 0.14 0.26 -3.60*** 0.00 0.00 -2.98*** 
BETA 0.89 0.86 0.70 0.90 0.85 0.76 
BIG 0.87 0.81 1.84* 1.00 1.00 1.64 
OPN 0.00 0.01 -2.46** 0.00 0.00 -0.86 
LARGE 0.39 0.39 -0.43 0.36 0.38 -0.68 
FOREIGN 0.15 0.12 2.58** 0.10 0.06 2.83*** 
See Section 4 for variable definitions. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
5.2 IFRS Non-Audit Consulting Service and Credit Ratings  
 
Table 3 reports the results of examining ICS effects on credit ratings. Given the discrete nature of our 
dependent variable (RATING), we use an ordered logit model. We present the results separately for each ICS 
variable (CONSULTING, FREQUENCY, and FEE). The results show that the coefficients of ICS*IFRS are 
positively significant in all three columns (p-values are 0.011, 0.020, and 0.058, respectively). Consistent with our 
hypothesis, this result suggests that rating agencies incrementally award firms receiving ICS from their auditors. In 
contrast, the coefficients of ICS are negatively significant (p-values are 0.014, 0.074, and 0.040, respectively) 
meaning that firms that purchased ICS before IFRS adoption faced reduction in credit ratings.9 The coefficients of 
                                                
9 It is not clear why credit ratings of firms receiving ICS before IFRS adoption are lower than that of non-ICS firms. One possible explanation is 
that the costs paid to the auditor for ICS, which might decrease net income is a non-trivial input in credit agencies’ assessment of firms’ 
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IFRS are all positively significant (p-values are 0.001, 0.004, and 0.005, respectively). It can be interpreted that the 
effect of IFRS adoption has improved credit ratings of Korean listed firms. Overall, we observe an incremental 
increase in credit ratings for ICS firms relative to benchmark firms. The remaining control variables are generally 
consistent with prior research. SIZE, ROA, EXPORT, GRW, BIG, LARGE, and FOREIGN are positively associated 
with credit ratings. However, LEV, LOSS, and BETA are negatively associated with credit ratings. Pseudo R2 is 
about 82%, and it implies that our selected variables explain the dependent variable well.  
 
Table 3. Ordered logit analysis: the effect of ICS on credit ratings 
Dependent variable = Credit ratings 
 ICS =Consulting ICS =Frequency ICS = Fee 
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
ICS -0.525 ** (0.014) -0.277 * (0.074) -0.038 ** (0.040) 
IFRS 0.365 *** (0.001) 0.358 *** (0.004) 0.368 *** (0.005) 
ICS * IFRS 0.949 ** (0.011) 0.295 ** (0.020) 0.033 * (0.058) 
SIZE 1.219 *** (<.001) 1.229 *** (<.001) 1.229 *** (<.001) 
LEV -1.418 ** (0.015) -1.387 ** (0.017) -1.366 ** (0.019) 
ROA 3.588 *** (<.001) 3.584 *** (<.001) 3.585 *** (<.001) 
CFO -0.464 (0.586) -0.442 (0.603) -0.470 (0.581) 
EXPORT 1.153 * (0.091) 1.225 * (0.077) 1.194 * (0.081) 
GRW 0.007 *** (<.001) 0.007 *** (<.001) 0.007 *** (<.001) 
LOSS -1.580 *** (<.001) -1.569 *** (<.001) -1.574 *** (<.001) 
BETA -0.939 *** (<.001) -0.973 *** (<.001) -0.973 *** (<.001) 
BIG 0.941 *** (<.001) 0.935 *** (<.001) 0.943 *** (<.001) 
OPN -0.980 (0.548) -0.977 (0.548) -0.993 (0.541) 
LARGE 1.942 *** (0.001) 1.917 *** (0.001) 1.902 *** (0.001) 
FOREIGN 5.278 *** (<.001) 5.309 *** (<.001) 5.321 *** (<.001) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
Likelihood Ratio 1966.65*** 1964.17*** 1965.83*** 
Wald Χ2 560.35*** 536.87*** 537.31*** 
Pseudo R2 0.8221 0.8217 0.8220 
N 1,139 1,139 1,139 
See Section 4 for variable definitions. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
5.3 IFRS Non-Audit Consulting Service and Interest Rates  
 
Table 4 provides the results of OLS regressions that analyze the relation between ICS and interest rates. 
The coefficients of ICS*IFRS are negative and significant when ICS is measured by the number of receiving ICS 
(FREQUENCY) and the cumulative costs paid to auditor (FEE) (p-values are 0.030 and 0.042, respectively). The 
coefficient of ICS*IFRS in the first column is negative, but insignificant (p-value is 0.525). The results are 
somewhat weaker in Table 4 than in Table 3, but it generally supports our hypothesis that creditors award firms 
receiving ICS from their auditors by lowering interest rates. The coefficients of IFRS are also negatively significant 
in all three regressions (p-values are <0.001, 0.015, and 0.026, respectively). The control variables are consistent 
with our prediction. In sum, the results in Table 4 suggest that the IFRS adoption decrease interest rate of listed 
firms in Korean stock market and there is a significant incremental effect of ICS on interest rate beyond IFRS 
adoption. ICS-firms that issue corporate bonds receive favorable interest rates from the creditors.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
performance. The other possibility is that the credit ratings of firms who purchase ICS are endogenously lower than that of non-ICS firms. We 
test this endogeneity issue in section 5.4.  
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Table 4. OLS analysis: the effect of ICS on interest rates 
Dependent variable = Interest rates 
 ICS =Consulting ICS =Frequency ICS = Fee 
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
INTERCEPT 0.071 *** (<.001) 0.072 *** (<.001) 0.073 *** (<.001) 
ICS 0.000 (0.991) 0.001 (0.437) 0.000 (0.409) 
IFRS -0.003 *** (<.001) -0.002 ** (0.015) -0.002 ** (0.026) 
ICS * IFRS -0.002 (0.525) -0.002 ** (0.030) -0.000 ** (0.042) 
SIZE -0.002 *** (0.001) -0.002 *** (0.001) -0.002 *** (0.001) 
LEV 0.019 *** (<.001) 0.019 *** (<.001) 0.019 *** (<.001) 
ROA -0.041 *** (<.001) -0.041 *** (<.001) -0.041 *** (<.001) 
CFO -0.011 (0.136) -0.011 (0.127) -0.011 (0.132) 
EXPORT -0.009 * (0.053) -0.010 ** (0.031) -0.010 ** (0.032) 
GRW 0.000 (0.575) 0.000 (0.555) 0.000 (0.553) 
LOSS 0.006 *** (<.001) 0.006 *** (<.001) 0.006 *** (<.001) 
BETA 0.000 (0.990) 0.000 (0.931) 0.000 (0.932) 
BIG 0.000 (0.977) 0.000 (0.961) 0.000 (0.957) 
OPN 0.035 (<.001) 0.036 *** (<.001) 0.036 *** (<.001) 
LARGE -0.008 * (0.063) -0.008 * (0.059) -0.008 * (0.059) 
FOREIGN -0.015 ** (0.026) -0.014 ** (0.029) -0.014 ** (0.031) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.4058 0.4070 0.4069 
N 1,139 1,139 1,139 
See Section 4 for variable definitions. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for firm-level clustering. 
 
5.4 Controlling Endogeneity 
 
The preceding results show that ICS is exogenously determined. However, if client characteristics affect 
selecting decisions in non-audit services then our results suffer from a potential omitted variable problem. Following 
prior research, we use a two-stage regression procedure to mitigate endogeneity issues (Heckman, 1979). In the first 
stage, we regress the CONSULTING variable on the determinant variables that affect clients’ selecting decisions of 
non-audit services.10 We then redo our analysis by including IMR (Inverse Mill’s Ratio) variables in each regression 
model. The untabulated results are consistent with our hypothesis that suggest ICS is positively associated with 
credit ratings and negatively related to interest rates in post-IFRS period.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Motivated by worldwide debate on the effect of IFRS adoption on the economic consequences of adopters, 
this study investigates the effect of ICS on the cost of debt of adopting-firms. We find that ICS provided from an 
external auditor is related to a decrease in cost of debt in the post IFRS period of Korean listed firms. In particular, 
receiving ICS is positively associated with a client’s bond credit ratings and negatively associated with interest rates. 
This result suggests that creditors reward firms that prepare IFRS adoption in advance by purchasing ICS from their 
incumbent auditors. The result generally holds when we use the indicator variable of receiving ICS, cumulative ICS 
fees, and cumulative frequency of receiving ICS. Finally, our results are robust even after controlling endogeneity 
problem arising from the client firm’s decision to purchase non-audit services from their incumbent auditor. 
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